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29 October 1980

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 43/80)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OF NEUTRON BOMB

Paris STRATEGIQUE in French No 7 Jul-Sep 80 pp 123-134

[Article by Jean-Baptiste Margeride: "The Enhanced Radiation Weapon - Part V: Strategic\* Positions and Conclusions"]

[Text] General Points

It is obvious that a nation which agrees to make the necessary effort to equip itself with neutron bombs will have obtained new and significant military capabilities. It is also necessary:

- to have a significant number of weapons. To hold a few samples would hardly have any practical significance (except for the fact that it would indicate a high degree of technical and scientific ability). It implies that one has large quantities of "military grade" plutonium, that is to say Pu-239.\*\* We will return to this plutonium problem;

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\* The word strategic is used here in its most general sense, that is to say going beyond the military field.

\*\* Let us recall that military Pu is isotope 239 of the element. It is produced spontaneously in nuclear reactors: the capture of a neutron by a U-238 nucleus, then emission of an electron which produces Np-239, then a second one leading to Pu-239. Later on, through the capture of a neutron, this isotope can produce Pu-240, then Pu-241, etcetera.

Pu-240 presents the inconvenience of being a much more active neutron transmitter than isotope 239. Its presence, in a not inconsiderable quantity (starting at 5 to 10 percent?), within the core of a fission weapon -- or in the initial stage of a fusion weapon -- can only lead to a breaking down of the energy of the explosion. In effect, Pu-240 acts, so to speak, as a permanent premature percussion cap.

The production of Pu-239 in the reactor is proportional to the length of time the fuel rods stay in it. The production of Pu-240 is proportional to the period of irradiation of isotope 239, already present; that is

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- to study, develop and produce a range of launching systems (ground to ground, air to ground, possibly ground to air), unquestionably closely adapted to each of the contemplated uses; thus, very diversified. Thus, a significant financial burden which would be added to the study and development of the nuclear warheads;

- finally, and primarily, the production of these weapons must respond to a real -- if not of capital importance -- need, in view of the above mentioned financial burdens and assuming a modest defense budget.

In this regard, the situation of France is not necessarily the same as that of the United States, the USSR or the other nuclear nations. What is involved here is a political-strategic problem which would require a specific, very delicate, study because there are hardly any rigid mathematical proofs in these matters. We will, thus, limit ourselves to touching on these questions for want of being able to claim having decisive answers to them.

French Neutron Bomb Possible?\*

One must distinguish between the scientific and technical capabilities of a state and its economic and financial capabilities.

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to say, ultimately, to the period of irradiation squared. Thus, it is very slow in the beginning, then more and more rapid. What is involved here is a first approximation, valid only for a few weeks, as it is obvious that, after a while, Pu-240 cannot be produced more rapidly than Pu-239 from which it originates.

Consequently, the obtaining of military grade plutonium requires that the length of time the fuel rods are in the reactor be relatively short. This time period is inversely proportional to the flow of neutrons which exists in the "core" area of the reactor where the fuel rod is placed.

As the priming of the fusion only requires a little energy for the neutron bomb, one might think that the presence of a significant proportion of Pu-240 would not cause any inconvenience. It seems that this idea is wrong and that, in this case also, the priming must primarily consist of Pu-239. As a matter of fact, the presence of significant quantities of the isotope 240 would lead to the deterioration of the tritium and of the electronic system; moreover, it would be very difficult to obtain a well defined primary energy level; an excessive permanent overheating of the weapon, etcetera, all of which are phenomena to be avoided.

\* Article written prior to the news conference of the head of state, on 26 June 1980.

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We believe that we are right in postulating that our experts should be able to solve all the problems which arise from the study, the perfection and the production of the weapon. However, the possible decision to go on to the perfection and production stage belongs solely to the public authorities, who could not commit themselves without relying on studies, which would be unquestionably of a preliminary nature, but already important and significant. For example:

- scientific and technical studies to define and articulate the difficulties which will have to be overcome, to develop a calendar of development;
- strategic and tactical studies to determine, first of all, the real usefulness of these weapons in view of the overall defense policy of France; the types of weapons and delivery systems and the number by type, if their possession appears necessary; finally, the implementation procedures required for the weapons systems decided upon;
- financial studies, because, once again, defense budgets do not allow everything to be done simultaneously and in all fields;
- economic studies, because a significant supply of neutron bombs could only be obtained at the expense of several electricity producing fast breeder reactors.\* Now, these reactors appear to be the only way to cover the period until we have developed for industrial use -- in the year 2020? 2050? 2100? -- the real thermonuclear energy source, that is to say the fusion of

- 
- \* Let us recall that the fast breeder system allows approximately 60 times more energy to be produced from a given mass of natural uranium, than do the current reactors. This means:
    - that it multiplies by 60 our national reserves currently considered to be economically exploitable by the conventional power stations (PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor], BWR [Boiling Water Reactor], etcetera);
    - primarily, that it allows the exploitation, under profitable conditions, of ores which are too poor in uranium to be used today. Our usable reserves would thus be multiplied by a factor as yet not very well known, but of which the most pessimistic estimates are on the order of 50.

Now,  $50 \times 60 = 3000$ . France's own energy capability could then be estimated at thousands of years, which would give it ample time to arrive at, first, the industrial fusion D + T, and next that of D + D, which is virtually inexhaustible.

Thus, the fast breeder reactor is the compulsory road to follow, but one has to take into account the fact that the time required to double a plutonium charge is approximately 20 years. To renounce, in favor of the neutron bomb, the building of N fast breeder reactors over a period of A years, would mean that one would have to renounce building 2N over a period of A + 20 to A + 25 years.



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deuterium. As a matter of fact, the fusion D + T assumes the possession of lithium, but world deposits are limited and practically nonexistent in France. This D + T system is a necessary step, but it does not provide the final energy independence of the D + D fusion, the conditions for implementation of which are much more difficult.

Before eliminating the possibility of a French neutron bomb, we would like to note a few specific points, undoubtedly secondary, but which might weigh on the decision to adopt or reject. The tritium necessary for the fusion is a relatively easy element to produce, through the irradiation of lithium. But it is not a stable body: its half-life -- the interval of time at the end of which only half of the original atoms would remain -- is 12 years.

This means that, after 12 years, half of the  $^3\text{T}$  present in a weapon will have been transformed into helium-3 ( $^3\text{He}$ ) through the emission of beta electrons. Now, helium, together with argon, neon, and krypton, is one of the elements in the set of "noble gases," which have no chemical affinity for the other elements: specifically, there is no such thing as oxygen "heliide," or metal "heliides." Thus, a gaseous pressure develops in the core of the device, and it will grow with time. Specifically, if the  $^3\text{T}$  is present in the form of "very heavy" water --  $\text{T}_2\text{O}$  -- there will not only be an escape of helium, but also of oxygen.

On the other hand, the potential fusion energy which the weapon would have to start with, would decrease if, in the beginning,  $^3\text{T}$  and  $^2\text{D}$  were present in proportions which correspond very exactly to the fusion. A remedy for this inconvenience could consist of producing the weapon with a certain excess of initial tritium, but the problem of gaseous emanation cannot be avoided.

As a matter of fact -- and apparently, like all thermonuclear devices -- a periodic repair of the weapons should be anticipated; we believe that the periodicity of this operation (removal of the  $\text{D}_2\text{O}$  +  $\text{T}_2\text{O}$  charge, recuperation of the tritium intact and the putting back into place of a "fresh" charge) could be 3 to 5 years (?). For a militarily significant number of devices -- that is to say, estimated at hundreds, if not thousands -- this would represent a heavy maintenance expenditure, to be added to those mentioned previously...

Getting back to what we said above -- specifically, that military grade plutonium can only be obtained by the insertion of uranium rods, for a short period of time, in the core of the reactor -- this requirement is translated into a clear loss of the electricity producing capability of a given mass of nuclear fuel. This loss is practically negligible when it involves -- for our current strategic and tactical weapons programs -- having a few hundred nuclear warheads at our disposal. This would be considerably less the case if several thousand neutron bombs had to be built.\*

\* The number of weapons to be produced can only result from very thorough studies. However, as a first approximation, and assuming an adversary

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Let us also get back to the above mentioned question of the neutron nuclear warhead delivery systems. Assuming that we might be able to produce a few thousand bombs, there would also be the problem of the delivery systems: indeed, one can assume that most of these delivery systems, except for non-guided artillery shells, would be very elaborate pieces of equipment: sensors, teleguidance or self-guidance, radar and/or laser environment, calculators, etcetera. That would represent a considerable expenditure ..

The preceding suggests, rightly or wrongly, that the enhanced-radiation weapon would not be very compatible with France's resources (except in fields of very limited use), unless the major share of its defense budgets were set aside for it, for a good number of years, if we were to opt for a very large number of weapons.

On the scale of Western Europe, this would no longer be the same. Its GNP equals that of the United States, that is to say twice that of the USSR.\* Consequently, the neutron bomb is within the means of Europe as a whole, even though two facts are contrary to this optimistic statement.

The first is too well known to need any expansion: a united Europe is not for tomorrow. Some of its member states have committed themselves not to produce nuclear arms: the percentage of the GNP set aside for defense would have to be doubled (at the very least) for the others ... Finally, there would remain the well known problem of a political authority empowered to make decisions concerning the use of nuclear arms in the name of the United Europe ...

The second fact has, to the best of our knowledge, only rarely been considered up to now. Very schematically, it may be summarized as follows.

Assuming that a united Europe were to launch itself in the construction of a defensive nuclear arsenal, based on neutron bombs, in order to defend itself from the permanent threat represented by tens of thousands of armored vehicles from the Warsaw Pact countries, it would not be possible to deploy this arsenal from one day to the next: it would take a period of time, the length of which can be roughly estimated at about 10 years. Is it reasonable

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having 50,000 tanks and an equal number of armored infantry vehicles at its disposal, if we assume that each bomb -- covering approximately 3 square kilometers -- could annihilate 10 to 20 tanks and infantry vehicles (possibly, an optimistic evaluation), a simplistic calculation would lead to the conception of an arsenal of 5000 neutron bombs, at least! This number does not take into account other conceivable uses: mini-ABMs [Anti-Ballistic Missile], ground to air and air to air missiles, etcetera. But, on the other hand, it does not consider the destruction of enemy devices by conventional means either.

\* With, however, this difference, that Europe only sets aside 3.5 percent of its GNP for defense, the United States 5.4 percent and the USSR 15 to 17 percent ...

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to hope that the USSR would readily accept seeing its prodigious forces, which it has obstinately developed over the last 30 years, at the expense of significant sacrifices and of the standard of living of its citizens, reduced to useless scrap iron?

In other words, would not the development of a defense force, which is considered to be absolute by its proponents, create the risk of inciting the countries of the East to use their means of invasion before it is too late? The answer to this question obviously relates to the field of hypotheses and political evaluations, but it would be risky not to consider it.

Neutron Bomb - Foreign Countries

Here again, we are talking about issues for which we dispose of only limited data. We believe that, roughly speaking, the following ideas may be advanced.

a) United States

In the fall of 1978, the White House officially announced President Carter's decision to authorize the production of the components of this weapon (an unspecified number). The term component is a rather fluid one and one may wonder about the real level of integration of these elements.

It would be surprising -- and seemingly unwise -- to limit the production to a few samples; for the United States to limit itself to the production of "separate pieces," of an elementary nature, to be assembled when the need for them arises. Because the need could arise in a manner as urgent as it is unforeseeable, it is likely that the integration would reach a level such that the last assembly operations could be completed in a few hours, on a production line permanently ready to function.

b) Soviet Union

The announcement of their experimentation with two devices was made on 17 October 1978. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union flaunted its intention not to go into mass production unless it felt compelled to do so by "imperialist-capitalist threats."

However, based on a few non-verifiable leaks, specialized reviews have been in agreement since the spring of 1979, in announcing the installation of very low energy nuclear weapons in the Soviet units. If, as all indications would lead one to believe, these rumors are true, it would involve either a new orientation (because, up to now, Soviet tactical nuclear weapons have fallen in the range of tens to hundreds of kilotons), or -- more likely -- neutron bombs.

Moreover, and because this involves devices which use large quantities of plutonium in relation to their nominal strength, it should be noted that the

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Soviet Union also seems to want to launch itself vigorously in the development of fast breeder reactors; a system which would allow for the production -- very rapidly if necessary -- of military grade Pu.\*

On this point, the reader should refer to an article published in ISVESTIA, dated 11 April 1979, and signed by Mr Anatoly Alexandrov, president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences: he presents the fast breeder reactor system as the only one capable of filling national energy needs when fossil fuels are exhausted, and he advocates very rapid development of this system.

The personality of the author and the name of the newspaper confer a virtually official character to this statement. It may be noted that Mr Alexandrov refers to a period of time for doubling the initial charge of plutonium "substantially lower than 10 years." This is very likely a long term view, because the French achievements and projects, currently the most advanced in the world, aim at a doubling in approximately 20 to 30 years. It is, of course, theoretically possible to increase the neutron flow in the core of the reactor, to gain time. But the problems of heat extraction -- which is proportional to the flow of neutrons -- appear difficult to solve in the medium term: consequently, with current technology, a fast breeder reactor with a doubling period of about 10 years does not seem very likely.

Of course, even though Mr Anatoly Alexandrov expands at length upon fast reactors, he does not mention their possible use for the production of military grade plutonium.

One may discover a certain contradiction between what we have just said and what was indicated above, with regard to France. We have noted that the production of a significant number of neutron bombs might prove embarrassing for the economic plan because the plutonium used for this purpose would be unavailable for the construction of one or more fast breeder reactors. For the USSR, as well as the United States, the construction of fast breeder reactors would facilitate the mass production of these weapons.

As a matter of fact, their situations are very different from ours: France has a pressing need for energy and, taking into account the "period of doubling," it cannot allow itself to put off the development of its supply of fast neutron power stations. It seems that, in the medium term future, it will have to choose between either a large number of neutron bombs or the fast breeder reactors. On the other hand, the USSR and the United States still have considerable sources of fossil energy at their disposal, which provide those two powers with great freedom to maneuver: at first, their fast breeder reactors could be used for the rapid production of large quantities of military grade plutonium -- Pu-239 --, with the production of energy being of only a relatively secondary interest.

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\* The flow of neutrons in fast breeder reactors is on the order of some  $10^{15}n/cm^2.s$ . It is 100 times weaker in conventional reactors. Although the exposure period of the fuel of the plutonium producing rods must be low (see above) in a conventional reactor (on the order of 100 days?), it would be reduced to a few dozen hours in a fast breeder reactor.

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c) Other Major Nuclear Nations

The situation of Great Britain can be considered as analogous to that of France, even though British military atomic research has always relied on American aid, and has experienced a noticeable slowing down since the sixties. Furthermore, the economic situation of that country remains poor,\* in spite of the petroleum from the North Sea. However, in case of need, the United Kingdom would have the necessary scientific and technical capabilities to develop a neutron bomb within the same approximate length of time -- a few years -- as we would need.

For China, the problem is more complex. Indeed, the necessary "mini-minaturization" of electronics involved in small volume devices could create a few additional difficulties for this country. However, the progress made by the PRC in this field has turned out to be much quicker than expected and could produce a few surprises. Furthermore, let us not disregard the fact that Japan has just agreed to the formation of a Sino-Japanese production complex, established in China, which will benefit from the Japanese know how in the field of electronics.

India is the fifth militarily nuclear nation. However, the only explosion produced up to now was not that of a "militarized" operational device, but of a preliminary model. The Indian nuclear arms technology is definitely behind that of the two big nuclear powers and the three medium ones. But it exists, and it is certain that, in the medium or long term, this country will be potentially capable of mastering the problems posed by the neutron bomb.

d) Non-Nuclear Nations

Here, we are considering the case of those states which, officially, do not have an atomic weapon, but which possess the technical and scientific capabilities which would allow them to have access, in the first place, to conventional fission weapons and, in the second place, to enhanced-radiation weapons, which are more "sophisticated." These are, for example, the FRG, Japan, the GDR, Sweden, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, Southern Africa, etcetera. But, international agreements for some of them, the veto of countries protecting them for others, the sound advice of a leader-friend for yet others, if not their own desire not to produce nuclear devices or the specific terms of the national constitution (in Japan), currently restrain temptations... Will this restraint hold indefinitely? Could not the fear of danger produce a change in attitudes and force decisions?

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\* French GNP for 1978, 2100 GF; British GNP, 1835 GF. In comparison, those of the United States, the USSR, Japan and the FRG were respectively 9447 GF, 4200 GF (estimate), 4345 GF and 2700 GF.

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It is obvious, however, that it is necessary to go through the stage of the fission weapon, if only for technical reasons, to develop the beginning of fusion. Moreover -- as we have seen -- the fact that the neutron bomb implies significant quantities of ammunition, it is not economically within the means of such nations as Israel or Switzerland. On the other hand, as it is an exclusively defensive weapon, it might be the type of device which could allow a state, such as Japan, to respect the spirit of its constitution, if not the letter -- which, as a matter of fact, is already the case with the existence of the "Self Defense Forces."\*

Neutron Bomb - Nuclear Spiral

One of the grievances often expressed against enhanced-radiation weapons is the following: there would be the temptation to use the neutron bomb to stop a local enemy breakthrough. However, even though they are low energy weapons, they are nevertheless /nuclear/ [in italics] weapons. The adversary would consider that it had the right to reply in kind; even, if need be, at a higher level. The duel would quickly, and prematurely, lead to a nuclear spiral, and up to a generalized exchange -- at least at the tactical level -- of weapons in all energy ranges.

This reasoning, based on the "very low" power of the neutron bomb, neglects the realities relative to tactical fission weapons of an ordinary type. Henceforth, the nuclear armory includes weapons, the power of which is like that of enhanced-radiation weapons, if not inferior. Let us note, for example, the warheads at the bottom of the range, the nominal 0.6 kiloton of the Lance missile and of the 203mm cannon, the nominal 0.1 kiloton of the 155mm nuclear shell.\*\*

It may thus be assumed that the fact that neutron bombs belong at the bottom of the range of explosive energy does not modify the more general problem of the threshold. This problem can be translated by the formula: nuclear or non-nuclear, and not the level of energy.

Tactical Weapons - Neutron Bombs

Would the possession of a very large number of neutron bombs result in the elimination of the more conventional (fission type) tactical nuclear devices, whose range of energy could reach approximately 100 kilotons? We do not believe so, for the following reasons.

\* See our article: "Japan, a New Military Power?," in the review DEFENSE NATIONALE, May 1978.

\*\* Data provided by the (non-classified) document: "A Primer on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities," NUCLEAR NOTES NO 6, Nuclear Agency of the United States Army (Fort Belvoir), June 1977.

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First of all, as the neutron bombs cause a veritable waste of Pu-239 for priming the fusion, whenever possible -- that is to say, when the firing would not risk affecting non-evacuated localities or friendly troops -- the use of weapons whose thermal and blast effect covers a vast area would be more economical than that of a significant number of radiation devices.

Secondly, the radiation only affects the enemy combatant. But, in certain cases, it will be necessary to attack the infrastructure (bridges, air fields, etcetera) or the terrain (forests). The explosion of weapons of a few dozen kilotons would transform a forest into a gigantic brush pile prohibiting the advance of any vehicle, even those with caterpillar tracks, for weeks to come. Similarly, the firing of a fission weapon would destroy floating enemy bridges while the neutron bomb would only eliminate the personnel operating those vehicles in the process of passing through and would leave the equipment, specifically the bridge, intact.

Finally, an invasion army is not made up exclusively of tracked and armored vehicles. It also consists of a very large number of wheeled vehicles, notably for logistic transportation, radar, helicopters, etcetera; all of this equipment is very sensitive to the effects of the blast, and its destruction would represent a serious handicap for the aggressor.

Thus, we believe that the nuclear armory of the battlefield will always have to include ordinary tactical nuclear weapons, even though very large numbers of enhanced-radiation weapons are put into service.

Conclusion

When we started writing these articles, we had anticipated including two chapters, dealing respectively with:

- a comparison between neutron bombs and /toxic gases/ [in italics], as the effects of these two types of weapons are often compared by certain authors;
- the concept of a /nuclear "Maginot Line"/ [in italics], which has appeared in various publications.

These two, more specific, studies will be published later in STRATEGIQUE.

To conclude, let us report that we are aware of the numerous imperfections of this study. In effect, and even though we lacked numerous data on the real facts and events, we have tried to reconstitute the genesis of the weapon. We have taken the risk of providing a technical description of a very particular device, as well as of its effects, even though our only sources of information were the few leaks, subject to reservations, unveiled by open literature. Furthermore, we have made calculations based on these questionable data, and sometimes resorting to simplified hypotheses.

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As for the proposals for the use of these weapons, some of them will certainly surprise technicians and strategists.

However, our excuse lies in the hope that, in spite of its imperfections and errors, our study -- as exhaustive and objective as our information allowed -- will encourage the reader to engage in those technical, tactical and strategic reflections which are always called for when a new weapon appears on the scene.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

MISSILE PROGRAM LAUNCHED BY MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Sep 80 p 14

[Text] Following the first news published on the decision to launch the SATCP [Ground-to-Air-Very-Short-Range (Missile)] program, the following commentaries have been communicated to us from authorized sources.

The ministry of defense has decided on the development of a very short range ground-to-air missile destined to complete the arsenal of which the French armed forces disposes, for the protection of certain objectives and of elements of the corps of battle against aerial attacks at very low altitude.

This system, complementary to the short range ground-to-air missile (SACP) and the medium range ground-to-air missile (SAMP) will permit the interception of aerial targets at very low altitudes, including the interception of helicopters, utilizing all the possibilities of masking offered by the terrain.

Defense against these attacks is currently provided by anti-aircraft artillery. It will be strengthened when these missiles are put into service. The new SATCP which answers to this need will equip the air force for tight defense of its bases and the army for defense of its units whether stationary or in motion. Also, it will be able to be utilized for the anti-aircraft defense of certain naval ships.

SATCP will be a missile of less than 20 kg, that can be carried on a man's back, capable of destroying at a distance of more than 4,000 m any incoming aircraft, even one that is hedge-hopping and making very tight maneuvers, and any attack helicopter, even on the ground, hidden behind a hill, or a curtain of trees.

The missile will be equipped with a high-performance infra-red auto-guidance system developed by Societe Anonyme de Telecommunications (SAT) capable of seeing its target from the moment of firing and of directing the missile to this target without any intervention from the operator ("fire and forget")

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capability). And more, the launch apparatus and the missile are designed for extremely short firing times, which will make it possible to cut down planes or helicopters appearing at the last moment.

Air defense by means of the SATCP missile is not a new concept, since Great Britain has already built the "Red-eye" and the "Blowpipe," Sweden the RBS-70, the USA the "Stinger," and the USSR the SAM-7. But it is still obviously very difficult to produce a missile that is simultaneously light, of large range, and capable of attacking planes and helicopters without the intervention of the operator during the missile's flight.

Thus the foreign missiles seem relatively slow, or of limited range and without auto-guidance, or of limited efficacy against helicopters. The French missile thus is at the forefront as one of the best SATCP systems, for it utilizes now decisive technological advances from which the foreign systems were unable to benefit at the time they were constructed.

The Matra firm has been retained for production of this missile, after having presented a proposal whose cost and performance seemed to the defense experts better than those of any other missile in the competition. When negotiations presently under way are concluded, Matra will get a contract for the development and manufacture of SATCP, the first consignments of which will equip the air force and the army starting in 1986.

About 10,000 of these missiles will thus be given to the French Armed Forces, and the remarkably high performance of the system permits consideration of real possibilities of exportation, if the French government gives the authorization.

Finally, a version derived from the SATCP is also being studied for mounting on vehicles for the army. This version, which will be coupled to radar systems carried by the same vehicle, will constitute an extremely formidable anti-aircraft defense.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

DEMOLITION ROCKET VARIETIES DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Sep 80 p 45

[Text] This year and for the second time Thomson-Brandt presented at the Farnborough Exposition its whole gamut of aeronautical armaments, both at its exhibit stand and on the underside of most of the airplanes in the static exhibition. And besides the 68-mm rockets spread out on rugs in front of the planes, the 100-mm rocket was shown by several foreign plane manufacturers. This rocket, which was ordered by the French air force, considerably increases the firepower of planes. The demolition version (DEM) provides a penetration to a depth of 3-m of earth and 30-cm of concrete before the warhead explodes.

It was also the air force's decision that contributed to the wide diffusion of the 100-mm anti-runway BAP, whose performance is unanimously recognized by the builders of combat aircraft and the air forces that use them. The interest shown in this bomb by NATO forces has increased proposals for its adaptation to different types of aircraft. According to Thomson-Brandt, the 100-mm BAP remains the only bomb to fulfill the mission of destruction/neutralization of runways under operational bombing conditions.

Also, the 120-mm BAP, to be used against light armored vehicles, makes use of the same adapter as the 100-mm BAP. The fragmentation of this bomb has studied for piercing the armored casings of the VTT [all-terrain vehicle].

These two bombs could be carried in great numbers by all service aircraft. Brandt introduced them at Farnborough under contrivances for multiple delivery permitting both the firing of rockets and the dropping bombs in salvos. The CEM-1 of Dassault-Breguet adapted to the Mirage F-1 and to the Alpha Jet permits this payload configuration.

Already introduced into the panoply of certain aircraft, the modular bomb consists of three super-braking modules. They assume a vertical attitude at the moment of impact and disperse 80-gram explosions at very high velocity. These three powerful modules level a zone of 200-m width by 600-m length. This new bomb is in the process of being qualified for the French air force.

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A 250-kg bomb with two modules has been researched in order to satisfy certain needs inherent in the mode of carriage.

Beluga, a saturation weapon, whose production is 50 percent with Matra, was also presented. In the same category, there was observed, near a rocket, some 74-mm grenades of explosives/charge creuse [translation unknown] ordered for the Alkan grenade-launcher.

We recall that Thomson-Brandt has also worked a lot on arming helicopters by means of rockets. It is offering special warheads, such as those with sub-projectiles, for use against light armored vehicles.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

STATUS OF EXOCET MM-40 MISSILE UPDATED

New Exocet Adopted

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 6 Sep 80 p 15

[Text] A communique from the Navy (naval branch of SIRPA [expansion unknown]) has announced that the Navy has decided to adopt the MM-40 version of the Exocet missile to equip some of its ships.

Derived from the MM-38 missile which is used to equip many naval units as well as close to 25 foreign navies, the MM-40 is an improved version (range of 70 km instead of 42). It is a missile with inertial guidance and self-directing active radar (produced by Electronique Marcel Dassault), whose trajectory keeps it at very low altitude above the sea (TRT radio altimeter), like the MM-38. The technological improvements put into the MM-40 will give naval ships equipped with it increased operational effectiveness. This will especially be the case with ships able to make use of radar information about the enemy, obtained and relayed by helicopters, for example. The MM-40 can be fired, by means of several minor modifications, from the same firing apparatus as that of the MM-38. It can also be fired from a special lighter installation.

The Navy's adoption of this sea-to-sea missile built under the overall direction of Aerospatiale follows a series of firings of the MM-40 that were successfully accomplished this year at the Mediterranean testing center.

Deliveries To Begin Soon

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Sep 80 p 59

[Article by Pierre Langereux--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

[Text] /The anti-ship missiles of the "Exocet" family have to date been adopted by 23 countries,/ which places Aerospatiale in the lead of European manufacturers of anti-naval missiles.

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The /"MM-38"/ sea-to-sea missile (40 km range), in service since 1974, has been adopted by /18 countries/ including France, Great Britain, and Germany. /More than 1,200 missiles and 178 firing installations have been ordered./ Aerospatiale says that more than 110 operational firings (118) have been successfully effectuated since 1974 with the "MM-38's" and that the periodic inspection of the weapons systems in service is now being done at 18-month intervals.

The /"AM-39"/ air-to-sea missile (50 to 70 km range according to the aircraft and the firing conditions) went into service in 1978. It was--or is--/adapted to 6 types of aircraft and helicopters/ for the /5 countries/ that have ordered it, including France.

The /"SM--39"/ underwater-to-sea missile is under development. This encapsulated version of the "Exocet" is for now specially destined for the /French navy/ which adopted it to arms its nuclear-powered attack submarines (SNA).

The /"MM-40"/ sea-to-sea missile (70 km range) has been ordered by /8 or 9 countries/ including France, which recently adopted it for equipping some of its ships (cf. AIR & COSMOS no. 824), in addition to the "MM-38's" which will be kept in service also. Aerospatiale announces that /the development of the "MM-40' has now been finished"/ and that /"the first deliveries of the "MM-40" missiles in the series will begin in the spring of 1981."/

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

ITALY

PSI'S DIDO COMMENTS ON ROLE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 13 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by PSI Parliamentary Deputy Mario Dido: "A More Concrete Role for the European Parliament"]

[Text] The European Parliament is beginning its second year, but the public is wondering what function it succeeds in carrying out with regard to the serious problems of the economic crisis and international relations. Bruno Visentini has faced the question in a series of articles in CORRIERE that opens a discussion well worth full consideration.

As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has limited decision-making powers, but one must remember that it is the first example in history of a democratically constituted international assembly, through the vote of the peoples of the countries concerned, and that it therefore is the direct expression of the desire of the citizens of a very great part of West Europe which potentially represents one of the essential regions for world balance. What basic reason, then, prevents the European Parliament from carrying out the hoped-for role of our peoples? One of the main reasons certainly is to be sought in the "nationalist" tendencies that influence many political groups and also included among these is the left (socialists and communists). These tendencies are translated into a split between those who are in favor and those who are opposed to the process of European integration, and especially to whether this process is to be administered by a "supranational" political power.

When the EEC [European Economic Community] emerged, the international economic situation was largely positive and European integration was sustained by an increasing expansion. Today things are radically different. Since 1973 we have been sinking in a crisis situation that has induced many countries to retire into their shells, in the hope of coming off better, through protectionism and self-sufficiency. But this is a dangerous illusion, given the degree of international integration attained by the economy. Moreover, it now no longer is a question of a choice between

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whether or not to have a supranationality, but between a supranationality administered by multinationals, by big banks, and by "governmental summits" and a supranationality implemented by democratic international institutions, which is what community institutions should be, if in fact the European Parliament is to succeed in carrying out a role of control, propulsion, and orientation with respect to other institutions and the national governments, themselves.

The economic and social problems that trouble the Community countries: 6.5 million unemployed persons, largely young people (who, according to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] will increase to 8 million by the end of the 1980's; an inflation that is now uncontrollable by traditional credit and monetary measures or salary squeezes; the dramatic crisis in some sectors (energy, automobile, textile, shipyard, metallurgy); the enormous obstacles to invigorating vanguard sectors (data processing) to quote only the most serious ones, are not resolvable without structural-type interventions, through joint, coordinated policies adapted to the European level, together with an agricultural reform policy and the complete implementation of the EMS [European Monetary System], within the framework of a strategy based on support of economic growth for developing countries.

On the other hand, Europe can have no credibility on the international scene with respect to its effort to contribute to the solution of conflicts that are always exploding ever more dangerously in various world areas if it does not positively define the matter of its internal cohesion in such a way as to demonstrate its own autonomy and effective capability of being a point of reference, both economic and political, for the deliverance of developing countries from the blackmail of superpowers and for a guarantee of balance at the world level.

It is therefore enormously important for the European Parliament to undertake a more active function and to carry out its role in this general strategy, beginning by considering that the behaviour of the political groups that compose it cannot be the same as the traditional one that is supported by national parliaments.

However, it does not seem to me that the matter can be resolved according to Bruno Visentini's interesting proposal (that is, the constitution of a parliamentary group of pro-Europeans of all political shades), for two reasons: first, because a generic pro-European inclination is not enough, by itself, to form a parliamentary group, one that then would split on the "contents" of the policies to be proposed during the integration process; but, the second reason is that such a group would turn out to be "removed" from the reality of the respective national political forces which, in the last analysis, are those that must be mobilized in the battle to build Europe.



It would instead be of decisive importance to bring about a close association of those parliamentarians or those components of the various groups that believe in this objective, in order to carry out an agreed upon action in all useful centers in support of a reform of community institutions, toward the creation of a supranational decision-making power (independently of the type of organization--federal or confederal--that may realistically be determined).

The problems of relations between the European Parliament and other institutions must be resolved: those of the European Council and the Commission and the role that they must carry out; the community "rules of the game" therefore must be redefined. The question of the powers of the European Parliament, which are only negative, must be dealt with (it can reject the budget and can censure the Commission, thus causing it to decline). It can block the EEC, but it cannot determine an increase in resources or appoint another commission. Therefore it is necessary first of all to provide an "explanation" to the various parliamentary groups and to find ways to unite all of the pro-European democratic forces in a common effort and to conduct a very positive fight, if we want the Community to be able to deal with the challenges that arise in individual European countries and in Europe as a whole, through the evolution of an international structure.

The objectives to be attained are: full employment, the elimination of regional and sectorial imbalances--inside and outside the EEC--, the realization of a new type of development that will be able to help the economic and social growth of the countries of the Third or Fourth World. Moreover, this is the basis on which it will be possible to build a sound peace.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DELPEY, BOKASSA, DIAMOND AFFAIR RESURFACES

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 20-26 Sep 80 pp 46-47

[Article by Rene Backmann: "Some Diamonds and a Cell: Giscard has replied beforehand to Bokassa's accusations: by a 'lettre de cachet'"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] /"They must let Roger Delpey speak. He knows everything, everything, everything."/ In these two sentences, in his naive impetuosity, ex-emperor Bokassa, during his hour-long telephone conversation with Claude Angeli, editor-in-chief of CANARD ENCHAINE, provided the true key to this strange and unwholesome affair-Delpey which seems today at least as bothersome for the Elysée as the "diamond affair" even if it has caused much less fuss up to now.

On 10 May 1980 Roger Delpey, a 54 year old writer, is arrested by the officials of the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance] (counterespionage) as he leaves the Libyan Embassy in Paris. Six days later he is charged with /"collusion with the agents of a foreign power of a kind prejudicial to the diplomatic position of France"/ by Jean-Claude Thin, examining magistrate of the National Security Court. The assistants of Christian Bonnet, minister of interior, swear, /"Delpey was preparing to discredit France at the highest level."/ It is then learned that Roger Delpey was preparing a book on Bokassa and that he had submitted it to several publishers. It is also learned that the DST has reportedly seized about a hundredweight of documents in Roger Delpey's suburban house and that among these documents are reportedly found some blank sheets of paper bearing Bokassa's signature. Finally, on 27 May, FRANCE-SOIR writes, /"according to reliable sources, Delpey is perhaps even behind the 'revelations' that gave rise to what is called the 'Bokassa diamond affair'"/. For several days, attacking with cleverly managed confidences, the assistants of the chief-of-state endeavour to circulate the convenient story of a plot intended to avenge Bokassa by discrediting his former protector, Giscard d'Estaing: a plot in which Libya is reportedly the financier and LE CANARD the instrument. And there we have Delpey as Bokassa's "tool."

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## A Man Like Me...

Delicate build, stern countenance crossed by a small brown moustache, Roger Delpey looks more like a modest civil servant reminiscent of the French empire than an international secret agent, even a temporary one. His biography, at any rate, is known. At age twenty a volunteer in the French expeditionary force in Indochina, Sergeant Delpey, having returned to the capitol, plunges into politics, at first in the RPF [Rally of the French People], then, out of loyalty to French Algeria, as a supporter of Tixier-Vignancour and in diverse small activist groups. At the beginning of the 1950's, transformed into a writer of the extreme right, he publishes a documentary book on the Indochinese war "Soldats de la boue" ["Soldiers of the Mud"] which is moderately successful. Other books, more modestly received, will follow in 1974 ("Dien Bien Phu") and in 1975 ("Hitler: le dossier").

Roger Delpey travels often, becomes particularly interested in the former French colonies and meets Bokassa. The decorated old soldier moves him. Perhaps because they are both former colonials the writer and Bokassa become friends. To such an extent that Roger will be one of the only two persons admitted to meet with the fallen emperor in his comfortable, but well-guarded exile in Abidjan. To such an extent also that Bokassa has entrusted Delpey to write in his name--whence the signed blank sheets--some letters to the heads-of-state of the OAU member-nations and to various notables, among them Jacques Chirac, to inform them of his condition. To such an extent, finally, that Bokassa hands over to his friend 187 documents, today in the hands of the examining magistrate, in which, according to Delpey's lawyers, /"the question is much more one of the ties which, according to Mr Jean-Bedel Bokassa, have allegedly connected Mr Valéry Giscard d'Estaing with him than of criminal ties with a foreign country."/

/"How do you expect that a man like me should be deposed and remain silent his entire life,"/ explained Bokassa in his telephone conversation with LE CANARD during which he affirmed having given diamonds to Giscard several times. /"I summoned Roger Delpey,"/ he continues, /"and I confided to him all that I knew about my case. My wife has seen us work. She listened to our conversations and said to me, 'It isn't necessary to explain that problem to Roger Delpey.' I said to her, But of course! I must defend myself." She said, 'Well, if this is so, I'm telling Giscard they are going to catch him...' That's what happened."/

It is therefore precisely because he knows, as Bokassa says, /"everything, everything, everything"/ that Roger Delpey has been in the Santé for four months, detained by virtue of what must properly be called a "lettre de cachet". For it is obvious today that the espionage affair, the /"Libyan connection"/ is only the legal cover for a smelly business. To date, no confrontation has taken place between Delpey and the Libyan Embassy officials, none of the Libyan diplomats named by Delpey in his statements to the examining magistrate have been interrogated, expelled or declared /persona non grata/ by the French Government. As for the documents seized

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at Delpey's home, what has become of them? It seems to have taken two vans for the DST officials to transport their loot. Today, according to one of Roger Delpey's lawyers, the writer's file would fit into a small carton... strange.

As for the /"Ivorian plot"/ which would explain how Bokassa was able, in spite of the surveillance of which he is the object, to telephone Paris to confirm the CANARD'S revelations, that does not hold up anymore. Most certainly, relations between Paris and Abidjan have been even better. The Ivorians, like other French-speaking Africans, reproach Giscard for not having kept an agreement made at Nice, which provided for the creation of an equalization fund to support the prices of exported tropical products.

But Felix Houphouët-Boigny is not the man to plot such operations against the Elysée. And, above all, there is nothing really unusual about this telephone call. When Delpey was free, Bokassa telephoned him regularly from his gilded prison. Deprived of his confidant, unable to restrain his anger and bitterness, Bokassa has merely chosen another listener. A decision which was not taken lightly: after having telephoned the CANARD, Bokassa sent a document to the paper, written in his own hand and dated 9 September in which he authenticates and confirms his telephone statements.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

HOW WILL FRANC FARE WITH VOTER'S BUDGET?

Paris LE NOUVEL OBERVATEUR in French 13-19 Sep 80 p 23

[Article by Roger Priouret: "A Good Budget for the Employers"]

[Text] Everything has been worked out so that the  
"party of order" will vote "well done" next April.

An austere budget? A voter's budget? These expressions, somewhat shopworn and contradictory besides, are not suitable to describe the document introduced this Wednesday, 10 September, by Maurice Papon following the ritual that is part of the Fifth Republic.

The 1981 budget is a budget for the voters of the "party of order" that the head of state spends his time putting together in time for next April-May. It is, therefore, his work and his responsibility, not the prime minister's nor the government's. It is not, however, a circumstantial project whose basic guidelines will change after the election, even if the remedies have been anticipated. It evolves from a triple conviction of Valery Giscard d'Estaing whose influence on economic activity must be measured.

First conviction: the tax (and social) burden has reached the ceiling. Therefore, it is not to be increased. Except for the highest tax bracket, the tax slice on income is adjusted so as to reflect the rise in prices. What is asked for, in addition, on alcohol and tobacco, depends more on public health than on the financial system. Likewise, a tax relief of one billion, by developing a relief for those families with three children or more, results from a concern for the population.

Second conviction: this one is linked to the first--the increase in outlay must be limited. Again we hear the old saw of the "party of order": "reduce government spending." The 1981 budget increases less than the price index; therefore, it reduces, in fact, outlay for public works--roads and highways, for example--and for government material (in the age of bureaucracy!). It heavily curtails subsidies for nationalized public services--which leads us to ask ourselves whether Raymond Barre's successor will not

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be compelled to increase substantially their rates beginning in July-August 1981 so as to make ends meet. And there is better--or worse: the president of the republic and the prime minister who are in the process of putting the finishing touches to the Eight Plan which must be implemented on the next of 1 January. This plan, like the Seventh Plan, contains "action programs of high priority" which every year require some billions in credit in the state budget. A small part of the total required has been included in the budget, i.e., no thought was given to the formal commitment that the Parliament will be asked to approve.

Third conviction: Our industry must become more competitive. It is anticipated that there will be for industry a tax relief of 5 billion by assuming 10 percent of the outlay that industry commits to the improvement of its equipment. The "party of order" is also the party of the employers.

The head of state's triple conviction has led him to satisfy the requirements formulated by the RPR last fall, at the time when the 1980 budget was under discussion and which it did not vote upon. If Jacques Chirac's party maintains the same refusal this year, it will be able to do it only because of a desire to be uppermost in the mind of the voters.

## The Franc in Difficulty

In order to make a judgment on this budget and the provisions accompanying it, we must ask ourselves about the economic consequences. First, there has been an announcement, on one hand, of a growth rate reduced to 1.6 percent (as opposed to 2.2 percent in 1980 and 3.5 percent in 1979) and, on the other hand, the beginning of a decrease in unemployment. Let us put aside this worrisome decline in growth. It is ascribed solely to the rise in price of energy, whereas it depends at least as much upon the loss of competitiveness in our prices, which are rising faster than our allies' and which leads us to sell less and buy more abroad. This growth rate of 1.6 percent will make it possible, at the most, to maintain the present rate of employment. So, Raymond Barre, in a summary that he made of his 4 years in office appearing in the last issue of LA REVUE DES DEUX MONDES, referred, as it happened, to the main fact: each year an excess of 250,000 young people and older women enter the labor market. Therefore, in 1981 as in preceding years, the rate of unemployment will increase. That is a certainty.

There is a question, however. An announcement has been made of an increase in purchasing power of 1.7 percent and of a rise in consumer outlay, in stable francs, of 1.9 percent. This is the crux of the problem: we will consume slightly more than we produce. So with a rise of around 10 percent, our prices go higher than our principal trade partners' prices: therefore, the purchase of equipment, strongly encouraged, will be made in part abroad, as usual. On the whole, we will have a trade deficit of at least 40 billion --which Maurice Papon, the minister of budget, does not challenge. Will the franc remain firm, a franc that is worth almost a quarter of a dollar, of which Raymond Barre is so proud? The great U.S. economic weekly magazine

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BUSINESS WEEK does not think so. The game has not yet been played out. According to all the cambists, it will be difficult after the departure of the present prime minister.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FOOD INDUSTRY NEEDS BOOST, NEW GOALS, METHODS

Paris PROJET in French Sep-Oct 80 pp 1007-1010

[Article by Henri de Farcy: "Mobilize the Agro-Food Industry"]

[Text] Could agriculture be "the petroleum of France?" That would be quite useful. In 1979 agricultural-food exports amounted to 64 billion francs, exceeding by slightly under 7 billion the 55.5 billion francs spent for imports. That same year the deficit caused by petroleum purchases totaled 65 billion; in 1980 it will be 125 billion. After all, why not make better use of the French soil which, accounting for one-third of the arable surface of the Nine, is being used at no more than one-quarter of its potential? Furthermore, why not "add" an even greater value to agricultural production? In 1978 imported goods averaged 3.15 francs per kilogram, whereas exported goods averaged no more than 2.01: a great deal of cereal crops or powdered milk compared with some Roquefort cheese or fine wines.

Could this be changed? It is with this in mind that recently Valery Giscard d'Estaing set up a secretariat of state for agricultural and food industries and assigned it to Michel Debatisse, the former president of the Federation of Agricultural Unions, thus emphasizing the major role of agriculture in any policy aimed at promoting the agro-food industry. Let us consider the current situation before examining the objectives of the new secretary of state.

The Handicaps of the Agro-Food Industry

Why has France fallen so far behind in the agro-business? French taste is perfectly satisfied with what could be described as the agro-craft. Bread is baked by individual craftsmen, unlike the making of "pastasciuta" or "delikatessen."

However, French taste is a poor export item, even though France is proud of the quality of its goods. Haute couture does not account for even one percent of the volume of our exports; foreign buyers are not rushing to

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champagne or Roquefort cheeses. According to Michel Debatisse, we should rather produce a gouda or cheddar, which are known the world over. Yet, a number of Frenchmen oppose this possibility. It is deemed necessary to educate the foreign consumer whereas we should begin with the French producer.

How to conduct a coherent policy with such a variety of enterprises? The agro-food industry is important: Employing 580,000 people, over 500,000 of whom are salaried, it accounts for nearly 10 percent of the total industrial employment and for 11 percent of the turnover in the sector. However, its elements are quite disparate.

The base is the mass of small local industries, founded one or two generations ago by an enterprising merchant or artisan, adapted to the processing of local products, occasionally able to acquire customers from an entire area or even from all of France. Frequently, however, they are very clumsy in promoting mass activities.\* Occasionally, these small enterprises become the starting points of more compact groups. In 1944, Jean-Noel Bongrain took over a dairy farm: three employees and one horse for the pick up; today the Bongrain-Gerard group employs nearly 4,000 people and exports one-third of its cheeses. This is an example of dynamism supported by a powerful commercial management and a laboratory which tirelessly explores new techniques for the manufacturing of baked cheeses.

Perhaps what characterizes the multinational companies operating in France is the size of their research. Whereas the food industry at large does not allocate more than 0.1 percent of its turnover to research, Nestle allocates 2 percent. The international groups account for most of the sales of processed goods and are continually launching new products. The same could not be said of the agricultural cooperatives which, brilliant exceptions notwithstanding, engage mainly in operations related to the initial processing of goods while still remaining unaware of its own strength: How many agricultural officials know that in 1978, with a turnover in excess of 100 billion francs, the French cooperative sector clearly exceed Unilever's global sales of 80 billion francs?

Naturally, it would be unfair to say that nothing has been done: Bonuses of all kinds, described in beautiful brochures, guarantee a variety of supports. The chambers of commerce give abundant technical and commercial advice; foreign trade advisors offer useful information. The Society for the Expansion of Agricultural and Food Production (SOPEXA) supports product advertising in France and abroad.

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\* Unlike the preceding sector (fertilizers, machines), the subsequent sector in agriculture has virtually no nationalized enterprises.

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Those engaged in such excessively dispersed activities forget that whereas the power of the multinationals stems from their multinational nature, it also requires their strong integration: Everyone, from those who supply capitals to the researchers, is interested in their success.

What is at stake in France is the concept itself of the enterprise, even more so than the support it receives. Debatisse concentrates on the notion of the enterprise: He redefines the role of the SOPEXA which, instead of thinking in terms of products should, henceforth, above all, support the enterprises.

The Transformation of the Enterprises

Clearly, this is an ambitious target. With a slight simplification, it could be translated into three types of action: defining better orientations, strengthening the ties between the enterprise and the tools of economic policy, and helping to find new means.

Helping the enterprises in their better orientation would presume long-term efforts. First of all, a clearer view is necessary: the mass of available information does not always deal with essentials. Eventually the various types of enterprises will have to be classified and data should be obtained for the various categories dealing with the amount of raw materials used, their added value, the volume of raw materials exported, their added value, and the amount of subsidies received.

Objective data should also clarify the irritating quarrel between cooperatives and private enterprises, each of which accuses the other of benefiting from fiscal, social or financial privileges. . . . Even though useful, the sectorial studies are insufficient for purposes of making an overall comparison which would enable us to better define their separate advantages and liabilities.

Without waiting for these long clarifications, the services of the secretary of state, together with the planning officials, have defined the most easily obtainable targets: In the wine sector, for example, it would be the standard table wines which would be purchased by some countries, the United States among them. Exports of dairy products should focus, above all, on cheeses, developing widely consumed goods. Conversely, it would pay to reduce our deficits in the areas of meats and canned vegetables.

The second feature would apply to the various types of support which the authorities give to the enterprises, including the most fruitful innovation of the current system: The conclusion of "development conventions" between the enterprises and the state. This is a contractual step which will be more emphasized henceforth in agriculture as in other economic and social sectors: public aid will be granted to the enterprises to the extent to

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which they pledge to engage in activities useful to society. The intervention of the state will be classified in such a way as to enable us to determine their nature, amount, and targets: The administrations should coordinate their activities and draft a standard document signed by the secretary of state.

In turn, the entrepreneur would have to define his targets more clearly, stipulate the means used and, above all, specify the type of association or alliance he establishes with his various partners (preceding or following him, or on his level). In this case the ritual exhortations calling upon the entrepreneurs to unite will be strengthened with a written document within the framework of respective obligations assumed by the industrial partners and the authorities.

Such an ambitious step would provide stronger support to negotiations between French enterprises and foreign companies engaging in joint activities without any loss of independence. This is a difficult task, however, considering the tremendous variety of operations to be carried out and of administrative mortalities as it takes a long time to organize such operations before the contracts are signed.

The last element represents the beginning of a change in the allocation of financial means. This will be the function of the new Institute for the Development of Food Industries (IDIA), administered by a council of industrialists, agriculturalists, and representatives of financial institutions. It will have a capital of 200 million francs contributed by the Credit Agricole, Credit National and the Institute for Industrial Development and, on a more symbolic basis, by other financing or insurance companies. The sum of 200 million francs seems quite small compared with the 5.7 billion francs of fixed capital raised every year. However, it is a novel experiment to the extent to which such loans will not be used exclusively for material investments but for supporting trade policies and for additions to private enterprise funds.

Compared with the work to be done such tools seem rather insignificant. No spectacular results should be expected. The effectiveness of such measures could be achieved only if the efforts are sustained by a deep and steady political will. We could see, however, the dawn of a second agricultural revolution, following the one in the 1950s when the farmers had plunged heart and soul in increasing yields, as the "engineering" brilliance of the agronomists displayed a superb ignorance of the rules governing the opening of markets. In our country higher agronomical education does not as yet include a department of marketing as it does of botany or zoology. In other words, the top agricultural officials do not acquire serious knowledge of the essential steps leading to the gaining of outlets, i.e., of considering the requirements of the receiver rather than of the supplier.

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Instead of simply encouraging the farmers to produce more by increasing their support of farming technology, the authorities would like to encourage them by offering them better outlets. They try to inhale rather than exhale. This is a profound revolution in concepts, which a farmer alone could impose upon other farmers. In order to succeed, however, a steadily renewed political will is indispensable.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

INJECTING CATTLE WITH ESTROGEN CAUSES SCANDAL, BOYCOTT

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 20-26 Sep 80 pp 68-70

[Article by Pierre-Marie Doutrelant: "Solid Gold Hormones"]

[Text] The man sitting before me has pocketed a billion centimes by selling estrogen for use on calves. It all happened quickly; in 2 years he was rich. And he got off easily; this sort of trafficking could, at the worst, cost him a fine of a few thousand francs. Furthermore, it is doubtful that he may some day be convicted. "Smart! I figured my caper out well. I love money." Not the slightest remorse. On the contrary, he attacks, threatens the system, furious that his deals have (despite everything) cost him a month in jail awaiting trial because of the "zeal" of a young examining magistrate.

"Mr reporter," he yells, pounding on his desk, "you can entitle your article: "Dr Georges Barre Is Going to Settle His Accounts." I ask you to invite me to appear on television. I will denounce the dishonesty of veterinarians. I will demonstrate that the laws enrich the Roussel-Uclaf Chemical Trust. I have all the evidence. Nobody would dare deny the fact." Georges Barre, about 50 years old, with a pirate's beard and manners, heads a luxury veterinary establishment in Perigueux with some humor dubbed "Our Lady's Polyclinic," no doubt because estrogens are miraculously multiplied there. Last year, he was the focal point of one of the first business ventures involving hormones for calves. "I was the scapegoat. It wasn't 80 percent of the calves that were treated with drugs; it was 100 percent. The livestock scandal is nothing but a money-making scheme from start to finish..."

Georges Barre is hardly exaggerating. Four-fifths of the calves come from commercial cowsheds. That is, they are raised in large numbers, several hundred at a time, caged and chained in filthy, stinking sheds, and put on 50 kg in 3 months time due to overdoses of artificial milk fodder enriched with poor-quality fats. They would all die, the poor things, if they were not stuffed with medications. Among these are estrogens and anabolic compounds, at the heart of the current dispute, because they offer the twofold advantage of producing a curative action and having a stimulating effect.

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A calf injected with an anabolic compound adds 10 kg of meat. Swollen with estrogen, it adds 20. It is the additional weight, artificially obtained, that makes for profit. Commercial stockraising is a business with narrow profit margins. If injections are eliminated, it means certain bankruptcy. So, almost all farmers inject their calves. Except for the 20 percent of "backward" farmers who remain faithful to the old so-called "calf-raised-under-the mother" method. The public authorities are fully aware of the reality involved. A 1976 law distinguishes simply between good and bad injections. The good ones, the "legal" ones, are anabolic compounds over which the Roussel-Uclaf Trust holds a virtual monopoly. The bad ones, the illegal ones, are the estrogens. But, they maintain, the estrogens are more effective and, to boot, cheaper! They produce twice as much extra weight for half the cost.

Despite the ban, three-fourths of the stockraisers resort to them. The estrogen connection is a traffic scarcely less profitable than the hashish traffic. The simplest cow hand knows the ropes.

Barre Will Be Whitewashed

First network: estradiol, a so-called "natural" estrogen.\* For a long time, Georges Barre was the boss. He quietly bought the raw product from Parisian laboratories, diluted it in Perigueux by adding antibiotics and cortisone, then sold his mixture for 300 francs a bottle or, by his own admission, for a profit of 50 percent. "Everyone in France asked me to supply them with it," he crowed. "The biggest cooperatives, the biggest manufacturers of cattle feed, the smallest stockraisers. Everyone. Everywhere they called me the 'good Dr Barre.' And for a good reason: Without trying to hide at all, assuming full responsibility with by billing and labeling, I sold the forbidden product. I assumed all the risks myself." The profits too, which Barre has today quietly invested in a recreational center.

His stroke of genius? Having used "natural" estrogen, banned, to be sure, but felt to be not particularly dangerous by scientific authorities if the conditions under which they should be used are respected (they never are). The Ministry of Agriculture is now talking of authorizing the use of estradiol. Therefore, if the 1976 law is modified, Georges Barre will be whitewashed. If it is not, he will pay several million old francs in fines for a profit of 1 billion! "When there is a stupid law, you have to take advantage of it quickly."

Half the veterinarians deal in estradiol, but on a small scale. A few bottles here and there to add to their income at the end of the month. Cleaver Dr Barre operated on a large scale at cut rates. He stole

\*Natural because it is naturally found in cow's milk and in certain plants. This does not prevent the chemical industry from synthetically producing it. Artificial estrogens are not found in nature.

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customers from others "as far as Dunkirk." Jealous competitors "turned him in." But all for nothing. The day after his interrogation, two other shady vets were fighting for control over the illegal estrogen market. They say that one of them is leading a gay life in Aquitaine and can depend on policy complicity. The other lives in Charente. I managed to talk to them on the telephone. No less dressed to kill than the good Dr Barre, what are they risking? They are only afraid of being ratted on before they can make their pile. "It's a rotten crowd. They turn each other in to steal the other guy's trade."

So I was "informed" about the "artificial" estrogen circuit, the network for the product that is competing with "natural" estradiol, the channel for diethylstilbestrol or DES. This the one customers most want to buy. DES is even cheaper and more effective than estrodiol. Suppliers of the raw material: Dipha Laboratories in Luxembourg and Ciba in Basel. Respectable firms that have their own laboratories. They are presumably not aware of the misuse people make of their products. Processors: foreign and French veterinarians as well as pharmacists. The names of several of them have appeared in current legal actions.

But the two most famous are a resident of the Pas-de-Calais and a Belgian, the latter an old acquaintance of French customs officials who have often nabbed him. The last time, he was picked up in Les Landes. He was carrying 1,000 bottles of DES: "To soothe the anxiety of young calves that have been taken away from their mothers," he joshed customs officials. His cargo was seized. He paid a fine of 60,000 francs. The next day he started all over again. (Do you want his phone number?) He sells 100,000 bottles a year. He confided to us that his annual gross income is 5 million francs.

#### A Gift of the State

He and other DES suppliers have go-betweens in each part of the country. They deliver the merchandise, often through a network of livestock carriers, to agents working in the 50 or so cooperative or private companies that control the commercial raising of calves. The agents distribute the bottles among technicians employed by these companies to make the rounds of the cowsheds. And these inject the calves with the forced agreement of the farmer. At each level, those involved get a bonus for the risk they are taking. "By making injections, I triple my wages," one technician admitted. His contract stipulates that he will be fired if he is caught giving injections. But just between the two of them, his boss has told him that, if he does not give injections, he will be fired even sooner. "Commercial stockraising means giving injections or starving," Bernard Lambert, a founder of Working Farmers, the only farm organization to have denounced the calf mafia with supporting evidence, ironically said.

A mafia which, according to George Barre, the ex-godfather, is one of the Roussel-Uclaf Trust's best customers. This company monopolizes the market in anabolic compounds, the other substance used to put weight on calves,

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much less effective than the estrogens and more expensive, but whose use is authorized. Roussel sells Ralgro and Forplix to stockraisers who want to perfectly legally inject their calves. (There are, however, those who do not: about a fourth of them.) Only the law ought to ban the use of Roussel anabolic compounds. They contain a product, Zeranol, which scientific studies have proven--and we cite them word for word--"have an indisputable estrogenic effect." The law bans estrogens and also substances producing an estrogenic effect.

Why is the use of Zeranol still authorized? "Because it's a Roussel-Uclaf product," Georges Barre charges. If we believe what he says, if all estrogenic medications except Roussel's are banned in raising calves, it means that the state has attempted to offer the dope monopoly to a chemical trust known to be on good terms with the government. Only the development of this fraud has spoiled their calculations. "Four million calves a year injected with Zeranol meant a gift of 10 billion old francs to Roussel," Georges Barre insists and swears to it, a bit late in the day very concerned for civic morality. Asked about this, the Order of Veterinarians appeared to agree with the analysis.

Let us sum up. Three-fourths of the commercially raised calves are fattened on estrogens. One fourth are treated with Roussel estrogenic anabolic compounds. In other words, 100 percent of the commercially raised calves are doped with substances that are banned or ought to be. Minister of Agriculture Mehaignerie is pulling our leg when he is scandalized by the watchword "boycott" (see box, p 69), wielded by a consumers union. Irresponsibility, he angrily says. He knows what he is talking about.

Calves treated with estrogens but also with antibiotics. What percentage of the animals are injected with chloramphenicol which makes "the meat whiter"? The same chloramphenicol which, applied in therapeutic doses on man, can have a fatal toxic effect through invasion of the bone marrow. Calves, but also pigs. Why did Mehaignerie this summer pardon a Breton group guilty of having thrown open to bidding 20 tons of antibiotics, including once again chloramphenicol? This group was anxious to take good "care" of the cute, rosy piglets it fattens on an assembly line right from birth. Irresponsibility, says this oh so thoughtless minister.

Fortunately, there are still some veterinarians left to protect the consumer... Noble souls. Their Council of the Order has just resigned. It is rebelling against the abuse of medications in the commercial livestock industry. It accuses groups of stockraisers, who are also qualified to dispense drugs, of being behind these scandalous practices. If only veterinarians were allowed to sell medications, order and moderation would reign in the cowsheds... "Hypocrisy," Georges Barre again charges, dead set on proving that the other vets are no whiter than he.

This sly fellow has set traps for them. He has sent friends of his to the bigwigs of the profession, to top leaders of the order's national union and to another 100 or so in addition. Each time, his messengers,



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who were not even farmers, obtained, without prescription and sometimes turned over to them by the maid, dangerous medications the use of which is regulated. Georges Barre has brought charges against all his colleagues who have been caught red-handed in the commission of an unlawful act. "A profession of soup-mongers. They have turned me in. But I will have my revenge," he crows.

The traffickers inform on one another. The state back Roussel-Uclaf. The veterinarians denounce the stockraiser groups and then take potshots at one another. It is the Far West, the O.K. Corral in the cowsheds. It is because there is a fortune involved. To stay on its feet, the commercial livestock industry swallows thousands of tons of medicinal drugs. An annual market of a billion francs. Who is going to control it? Until 1980, "peddlers," uneducated individuals moving between fair and cowshed, sold 60 percent of these drugs, vets 30 percent and pharmacists 10 percent. The law has just eliminated the peddlers. So, today it is rackets and intrigues everywhere. Whoever can wheel and deal the most to capture the peddler's clientele wins out. This slaughter will only produce one victim: that pig [i.e., sucker] of a consumer--excuse me, that calf!

#### A Successful Boycott

The Federal Consumers Union boycott ("What Do We Choose?") has succeeded. A 50-percent drop in sales has been recorded. The Ministry of Agriculture is extremely concerned over the turn of events, which cost 50 million consumers. the National Consumption Institute's journal, an injunction in fact followed by withdrawal from publication of a planned article on medications and stockraising: "Don't Carry Beef." As for farm leaders, they are wailing: "If this goes on, in 2 weeks time we will have to dump our calves since, given the way they are fed, these animals cannot live for very long." A sacred confession!

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ICSA-GALLUP POLL ON ANDALUCIA AUTONOMY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 14 Sep 80 pp 26-29

[Text] By the end of June of this year, the Icsa-Gallup firm had completed a poll on the political positions of the Andalusians, with some surprising results. It was taken during May and June, not long after the big fiasco of the referendum of 28 February concerning Andalusian autonomy.

But the results were kept among a select group of purchasers: certain political parties and a few individuals particularly interested in the findings, such as Manuel Clavero Arevalo, one of the politicians who came out best in the poll.

Others, such as UCD [Democratic Center Union], may not have been interested in the Icsa-Gallup opinion survey: At least the results are obviously disappointing for the government party, as well as for the Communist Party. The leaders of the Andalusian Socialist Party [PSA], on the other hand, had reason to smile with satisfaction as they perused the 50 pages of the "Basic Study of Andalusia," as the poll was officially termed.

Emilio Lechuga, of the PSA executive board, did not conceal from this magazine the fact that, "we consider it positive, because we gained four points as a result of the strategy pursued with regard to the process of autonomy."

Finally, after many inexplicable problems, Santiago Traver from CAMBIO 16 obtained access to the complete results of the Icsa-Gallup poll. Following are the most significant data on the political conduct and views of the Andalusians.

Less and More

The disillusionment of the Andalusians at the experience of the referendum of 28 February appears evident from the replies gathered to the question as to whether they would vote in the event that new elections were held at the time of the interview. Less than 55 percent answered "yes," whereas the participation in the 1979 legislative elections amounted to 68.6 percent.

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However, the organizers of the poll were not unaware of the fact that it is one thing to ask, hypothetically, whether someone would vote when there is no election campaign or elections in sight, and that the real situation, wherein many other factors (propaganda, current situation, etc.) appear as motives for deciding on participation, is something else.

Therefore, in the distribution of votes according to party, the work was done with hypotheses that took these variables into account.

The results are not very encouraging for the Communists, who declined 4.5 percent in comparison with the elections of 1 March 1979; but this holds true particularly for the Democratic Center Union, whose votes dropped by nearly 8 percent. The Icsa-Gallup report states that the UCD voter is "rather disloyal," and also "rather confused, and this...indicates the existence of a political area that UCD could not readily cover."

In summary, the report notes: "The votes lost by UCD will go to the right wing Democratic Coalition (CD), the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and the Andalucian Socialist Party (PSA). As a result of this, CD receives a considerable boost, similar to the one experienced by PSA, which, in turn, gains votes of varying origins." On the other hand, "PSOE is not far removed from its results of last year, counteracting losses and gains in the final balance."

Right and Left

In order to determine the Andalucian political area, the pollsters gave to those interviewed a card with 10 boxes arranged in a horizontal line, with "right" and "left" printed at the ends. Upon looking at this card, they were asked to describe their own position: to decide, in the right-left spectrum, on the position that they considered themselves to hold personally (more to the right, more to the left or in the center).

Nearly 40 percent of those interviewed chose not to answer, but the majority of the rest selected a position in the center.

Using a similar card system, but with the titles "Andalucia" and "Spain" at the ends, an attempt was made to determine the tendencies toward regionalism, and the result was a large majority describing themselves as Andalucians (56 percent), a minority of 18 percent inclined toward "Spanish orientation," and the remaining 26 percent declining to answer.

According to the report, the personal positions assumed by those polled reflect no surprises in comparison with the 1979 election results. It states: "The majority of the population describes itself as leftist, with moderate and center-left views predominating. The less extensive right is mainly centrist."

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Insofar as personal inclination toward "Andalucian orientation" or "Spanish orientation" is concerned, Icsa-Gallup concludes that the former, "as a rejection of centralism in its varying degrees, is the position of the majority of the population polled."

Appearances and Reds

It summarizes: "So, the (Andalucian) electorate as a whole holds a center-left position in the social political realm, and is somewhat more inclined toward Andalucian-oriented attitudes. There actually is a high degree of correlation between being leftist and being Andalucian-oriented."

How do the Andalucians view their political parties, on the basis of these aspects of right-left and Spanish-Andalucian orientation?

According to the data from the poll, the Communist Party and the Workers Party are considered "inclined toward the left," quite obviously, by the Andalucian voters. In the broad center they place the two Socialist parties (PSOE and PSA), UCD and a presumed future political entity headed by Manuel Clavero Arevalo, the Andalucian-oriented UCD dissident.

Both the PSA and PSOE are regarded as equally leftist; but the PSA is far more Andalucian-oriented than the PSOE.

Somewhat the same holds true for UCD and Clavero's hypothetical party. The latter appears to be moderately Andalucian-oriented (rather like the PSOE), but more right-center than UCD.

Youth on the Left

If a comparison is made between the self-description of the average voter (that is, how the majority of those polls described their position with regard to the right-left and Spanish-Andalucian orientation) and the majority view of the political parties, the PSOE turns out to be the party closest to the majority: The report on the poll summarizes: "It coincides from the regionalist standpoint (moderate Andalucian orientation) and is slightly directed toward the left. Clavero Arevalo's entity and PSA are not far removed." UCD, on the other hand, is relegated toward the right, leaving political room for the hypothetical party of Clavero Arevalo, a space caused essentially by the greater Andalucian orientation of the former UCD leader, rather than by the ideological essence of his future party.

Escuredo, the Pretty Child

The poll brought no surprises with respect to the ages of those interviewed and their political position: "Those under the age of 35 are closer to the PSA, those between 35 and 50 are closer to Clavero Arevalo's hypothetical party and those over 55 years old identify themselves with UCD." The Basic Study concludes by saying that, on the other hand, PSOE "has a good standing in all age groups, although it does not rank first in any."

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Those polled were also asked about the degree of confidence (on a scale of 0 to 10) inspired among them by the chief Andalucian and national leaders, because "Andalucians have little identification with political parties, and put their confidence more in the leaders," with the exception of the PTA [Andalucian Workers Party] and PSA, whose top-ranking leaders proved to be less well known than their political groups.

The best image of confidence was given by the head of the Junta of Andalucia and leader of PSOE, Rafael Escuredo, followed by the Sevillian Felipe Gonzalez, the top-ranking leader of the same party.

Manuel Clavero Arevalo appeared in third place, followed by Alejandro Rojas Marcos, of the PSA. Last place (out of a total of nine) as the politician evoking the least confidence among Andalucians, was occupied by Blas Pinar, leader of the New Force.

The Best and the Worst

Actually, Blas Pinar's party only occupied first place when, in a battery of questions, those interviewed were asked which was the least democratic party. The Andalucians apparently identify what is nondemocratic with the right: New Force was considered the least democratic by 35 percent of those polled, and the Democratic Coalition was considered such by 13 percent.

In the questions about current political problems, the most preferred was PSOE: The majority considered it the party most capable of putting an end to the inequality and injustice in the country, the one most willing to have dialog and make agreements, the one most concerned over the problem of women, youth and the family, the one most concerned about the problems of workers, farmers and agriculture, the one with the most steadfast attitude toward terrorism and the one which could best resolve the problem of unemployment and the economic problem.

UCD occupied first place on the black list of shortcomings. According to the majority of those polled, it is the party most to blame for the present situation (40 percent), the one most dependent on the United States, Madrid and the multinationals, and the one with the most ambitious leaders.

Of the other political groups, PSA is the party with the greatest capacity to govern to the advantage of all Andalucians; and PCE [Spanish Communist Party] is the staunchest foe of the landholders, but also the one most dependent on the Soviet Union.

Ugly and Pretty Ones

It was probably because PSOE received so many compliments from those polled that it was the first party to purchase the poll from Isca-Gallup.

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Jose Rodriguez de la Borbolla, "Pepote", the secretary general of Pablo Iglesias' party in Andalucia, explained to CAMBIO 16 that, "The results are logical, predictable and possible at the present time. There has been an outright collapse of UCD, owing to its lack of response to the needs of Andalucia, and a growth in our party (actually of only 0.8 percent in comparison with the 1979 legislative elections); because we are responding to those needs, and our backing for autonomy is more visible. Clavero Arevalo is the counterpart for the political vacuum left by UCD. PSA has shown a slight growth (2.9 percent). The latter represents a change in the trend of opinion which occurred recently, and which was reflected in the Basque Country and Catalonia. The majority of the Andalucian electorate is still wavering between the great options of left and right."

Borbolla confesses that PSOE is very satisfied to have two of its leaders (Escuredo and Gonzalez) at the top of the list indicating the voters' confidence. "One of the fundamental issues in politics is personifying ideas, and we have that now in two specific persons who have the backing of the electorate. Therefore, we shall promote Escuredo and give Felipe more of a physical connection with Andalucia."

Clavero Arevalo also has reasons for rejoicing. He stressed: "With regard to the level of confidence, only Escuredo and Felipe Gonzalez are ahead of me." The poll helped Clavero "to confirm my idea that this political space exists to be filled; now we are closer to becoming a reality," as he told this magazine.

To be sure, Suarez' former minister bought the poll from Isca-Gallup, one "which is completely favorable toward me." However, he is not yet certain whether his "hypothetical political entity" will be created. He said: "At the present time, we have better prospects, and I think that we shall know very soon for certain whether we shall take that step."

On the other hand, Emilio Lechuga, from the Andalucian Socialist Party, does not believe in Clavero Arevalo's chances. He remarked: "His entity is not viable because the solutions for Andalucia do not include a right wing, interclass nationalist entity."

Finally, the Democratic Center Union of Andalucia could not give its opinion of the poll, if it actually has one. All its leaders were still on vacation, leaving only one person "to take calls."


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(1) Orientación del voto andaluz				
	(2) Datos directos de la encuesta mayo-junio/80	(3) Hipótesis más probable mayo-junio/80	(4) Elecciones 1-M-79	(5) Desplaza- mientos de opinión
PSOE ....	27,1	34,4	33,6	+ 0,8
UCD ....	20,1	24,1	31,9	- 7,8
PCE ....	3,6	8,9	13,4	- 4,5
PSA ....	12,6	14,0	11,1	+ 2,9
CD ....	6,8	7,8	4,3	+ 2,9
PTA ....	4,4	4,6	2,3	+ 3,5
UN ....	1,4	1,6	1,6	+ 2,3
(6) Otros ....	4,3	4,6	1,8	
(7) No contesta	19,8	-	-	
	100,0	100,0	100,0	

Key:

1. Direction of the Andalusian Vote
2. Direct data from the May-June 1980 poll
3. Most likely hypothesis, May-June 1980
4. Elections of 1-M-79
5. Changes of opinion
6. Others
7. No answer




Key:

1. Where They Place the Political Parties
2. Left
3. Right.

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Key to double chart "Self-Definition of the Electorate With Respect to Political Position and Regionalism"

1. Left left
2. Moderate left
3. Center left
4. Right center
5. Moderate center
6. Right right
7. No definition
8. Total left
9. Right
10. No definition
11. Radical Andalusian orientation
12. Moderate Andalusian orientation
13. Very moderate Andalusian orientation
14. Very moderate Spanish orientation
15. Moderate Spanish orientation
16. Radical Spanish orientation
17. No definition
18. Andalusian orientation
19. Spanish orientation
20. No definition

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**DISTANCIAS ENTRE LA UBICACION MEDIA DEL  
ELECTORADO Y LOS PARTIDOS**  
(1) (Escala convencional de 0 a 10)

	(2) Distancia política	(3) Distancia regionalidad	(4) Distancia total (1)
Distancias entre el electorado y PSOE (5).....	+ 0,8	- 0,1	0,8
Distancias entre el electorado y P. de Clavero (6)....	- 1,3	- 0,6	1,4
Distancias entre el electorado y PSA (7).....	+ 0,9	+ 1,5	1,7
Distancias entre el electorado y PCE (8).....	+ 2,1	- 0,1	2,1
Distancias entre el electorado y PTA (9).....	+ 2,1	+ 1,3	2,5
Distancias entre el electorado y UCD (10).....	- 2,1	- 3,3	3,9
Distancias entre el electorado y CD (11).....	- 3,2	- 3,9	5,0
Distancias entre el electorado y FN (12).....	- 4,3	- 5,0	6,6

(1) Cuando hay un signo positivo quiere decir que el electorado está más a la derecha que el partido o es más españolista que el partido (según se trate de una u otra escala). El signo negativo indica justo lo contrario, más izquierdista o más andalucista. En las distancias totales no hay signos positivos o negativos, sino valores absolutos.

Key:

1. Distances Between the Average Position of the Electorate and the Parties (conventional scale of 0 to 10)
2. Political distance
3. Regionality distance
4. Total distance
5. Distances between the electorate and PSOE
6. Distances between the electorate and the Clavero Party
7. Distances between the electorate and PSA
8. Distances between the electorate and PCE
9. Distances between the electorate and PTA
10. Distances between the electorate and UCD
11. Distances between the electorate and CD
12. Distances between the electorate and FN
13. When there is a plus sign, it means that the electorate is more to the right than the party, or is more Spanish-oriented than the party (depending on whether one scale or the other is involved). The minus sign indicates just the opposite, more leftist or more Andalusian-oriented. In the total distances, there are no plus or minus signs, but rather absolute figures.

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## Los mejores y los peores

(1)

	UCD (%)	PSOE (%)	PCE (%)	FN (%)	CD (%)	Partido de Clavero (%)	PSA (%)	PTA (%)	N. C. (%)	Total
¿Cuáles son los partidos más capaces de acabar en España con la desigualdad y las injusticias? ... (2)	12	33	9	3	7	2	6	5	49	126
¿Cuáles son los partidos más dispuestos al diálogo y al pacto? ... (3)	18	38	11	2	6	4	10	6	46	141
¿Cuáles son los partidos más capaces de gobernar en provecho de todos los andaluces? ... (4)	6	25	6	1	2	5	32	10	39	126
¿Cuáles son los partidos que más se preocupan por los problemas de las mujeres? ... (5)	6	18	11	2	2	1	4	7	69	120
¿Cuáles son los partidos más decididos a luchar contra los terroristas? ... (6)	1	27	31	1	0	1	7	14	46	128
¿Cuáles son los partidos que mantienen una actitud más firme frente al terrorismo? ... (7)	16	19	9	13	14	4	5	5	56	141
¿Cuáles son los partidos que más se preocupan de los trabajadores? ... (8)	5	41	19	2	2	2	6	19	40	136
¿Cuáles son los partidos más culpables de como están las cosas actualmente? ... (9)	40	13	15	19	15	8	8	8	52	178
¿Cuáles son los partidos menos democráticos? ... (10)	11	3	11	35	13	1	1	4	56	135
¿Cuáles son los partidos con líderes más ambiciosos de poder personal? ... (11)	27	18	10	17	14	5	6	4	52	153
¿Cuáles son los partidos que se preocupan por los campesinos y la agricultura? ... (12)	3	32	16	1	1	2	11	15	50	131
¿Cuáles son los partidos que se preocupan más por los problemas de los jóvenes? ... (13)	7	25	12	4	4	2	5	7	62	128
¿Cuáles son los partidos que se preocupan más por defender la familia? ... (14)	15	18	7	8	11	2	3	4	59	127
¿Cuáles son los partidos que dependen más de la Unión Soviética? ... (15)	1	5	41	0	0	0	0	4	55	106
¿Cuáles son los partidos que dependen más de Estados Unidos? ... (16)	37	3	2	5	7	1	0	0	59	114
¿Cuáles son los partidos que reciben más dinero del extranjero? ... (17)	14	16	9	1	2	0	1	1	70	114
¿Cuáles son los partidos que reciben más dinero de las empresas multinacionales? ... (18)	19	3	11	3	4	0	0	0	78	107
¿Cuáles son los partidos que dependen más de Madrid? ... (19)	27	14	11	12	13	4	3	3	51	158
¿Cuáles son los partidos que pueden resolver mejor el problema económico y el problema del paro? ... (20)	13	31	13	2	4	2	5	7	54	131

Key:

1. The Best and the Worst
2. Which parties are most capable of ending inequality and injustices in Spain?
3. Which parties are most willing to hold dialog and make agreements?
4. Which parties are most capable of governing to the advantage of all Andalusians?
5. Which parties are most concerned about women's problems?
6. Which parties are most determined to fight the landholders?
7. Which parties have the most steadfast attitude toward terrorism?
8. Which parties are most concerned about the workers?
9. Which parties are most to blame for the current state of affairs?
10. Which parties are least democratic?
11. Which parties have leaders most ambitious for personal power?
12. Which parties are concerned about the farmers and agriculture?
13. Which parties are most concerned about the problems of youth?
14. Which parties are most concerned about protecting the family?
15. Which parties depend most on the Soviet Union?
16. Which parties depend most on the United States?
17. Which parties receive the most money from abroad?
18. Which parties receive the most money from the multinational companies?
19. Which parties depend most on Madrid?
20. Which parties could best resolve the economic and unemployment problems?

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END

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